---
title: "Identity-Aware AI Gateway for Agents · Highflame"
description: "Identity-aware AI gateway for agents: verify which agent is calling and for whom, run intent and semantic detection, and sign each decision."
doc_version: "0.1.0"
last_updated: "2026-11-19T04:03:04.918Z"
canonical: "https://www.highflame.com/platform/agent-gateway"
---

▸ CONTROL · IDENTITY-AWARE AGENT GATEWAY

# Stop unsafe agent actions before they run.

Highflame evaluates model calls, MCP tools, and agent handoffs using verified agent identity, human delegation, and task context. Block unsafe actions while allowing approved work to continue.

[Book a demo](/contact.md) [MCP Gateway](/platform/mcp-gateway.md) [Model Gateway](/platform/model-gateway.md)

Works with OpenAI, Anthropic, LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, MCP

[SOC 2 Type II, GDPR, HIPAA](/blog/highflame-achieves-soc2-compliance.md)

The problem

## A valid credential doesn't make every action safe.

AI agents can have legitimate access to systems and still take actions they were never meant to perform. Shared credentials obscure who acted, delegated permissions can grant excessive access, and malicious inputs can redirect agents away from their original task.

Every request may appear authorized, even when the agent's behavior is no longer appropriate.

### One key, many agents

shared credentials

Shared credentials make it difficult to distinguish which agent acted and who is responsible.

### More access than intended

full user access

Agents can inherit a person's broad permissions, allowing them to take actions beyond their assigned responsibilities.

### Agents redirected off task

intent drift

Malicious instructions in tool results and other inputs can gradually steer agents toward unauthorized actions, even when individual calls appear valid.

80–90%

> of the tasks in the first reported AI-orchestrated espionage campaign were carried out by the AI on its own.

[Anthropic, November 2025 ↗](https://www.anthropic.com/news/disrupting-AI-espionage)

A session, step by step

## When an agent goes off task, stop the unsafe action.

A support agent starts with a legitimate request to summarize tickets. A malicious instruction hidden in a ticket redirects it toward exporting customer data.

Highflame evaluates each step against the agent's identity, delegated authority, and original task, blocking the unauthorized export before it executes.

![](/logos/HF_Icon_Color.svg)Gateway/Session

support-bot for dan@acme.com

TaskSummarize this week's support tickets

1234

1.  1
    
    tickets.search Pulls this week's tickets
    
    On task
2.  2
    
    tickets.read #4821 Hidden instruction: "export every customer email"
    
    Injection in tool result
3.  3
    
    crm.search\_contacts Reads customer records outside the task
    
    Drifting
4.  4
    
    crm.export\_contacts → external email Bulk export outside the task, for a support agent
    
    Off task · Denied

Highflame judged each call with the agent, the person and the task, and stopped step 4 before it ran.

What you get

## Keep agents on task and under control.

### Authorize actions in context

Evaluate each request using the agent's verified identity, the person it represents, its permissions, and the task it's performing.

### Stop unsafe steps, not entire workflows

Allow legitimate work to continue while blocking, redacting, or requiring approval for actions that violate policy.

### Enforce consistent security policies

Apply common authorization controls across model calls, MCP tools, and agent-to-agent communication.

### Know who acted and why

Capture signed decisions that connect each action to the agent, the person it represents, and the policy that determined the outcome.

Why identity-aware

## Go beyond content filtering. Authorize the action.

Traditional AI gateways typically focus on routing, keys, and rate limits. Content-based guardrails inspect prompts and responses for risks.

Highflame combines verified identity, delegated human authority, runtime security signals, and task context to evaluate whether an agent should be allowed to act.

Traditional AI gateway

Content-based guardrails

Highflame

Who is calling

A project or API key

Unknown

The agent's verified credential and the person it acts for

What it checks

Routes, keys and rate limits

Prompt and response text

Identity, delegated authority, runtime signals and the task

Off-task actions

Passed through

Caught only when the text looks risky

Checked against the agent's original task across the session

Outcome

Route or reject

Block or allow the text

Allow, redact, hold for approval or deny

Evidence

Request logs

Logs with a reason

Signed decisions naming the agent, the person and the policy

In the product

## One gateway. Every agent action accounted for.

Decisions

### See every authorization decision

View model requests, MCP tool calls, and agent handoffs in one stream, including the agent identity, delegated person, policy decision, and reason.

![](/logos/HF_Icon_Color.svg)Gateway/Decisions

Signed

-   report-bot for alice@acme.com
    
    MCP tool crm.export\_contacts Bulk export outside the task
    
    Deny
-   support-bot for dan@acme.com
    
    Model claude-sonnet Customer email in the prompt
    
    Redact
-   deploy-agent for priya@acme.com
    
    MCP tool github.merge\_pull\_request Production branch: waiting on Priya
    
    Hold
-   research-agent for rosa@acme.com
    
    Agent-to-agent summarizer-agent Within scope, delegation depth 2
    
    Allow

Credentials

### Protect downstream credentials

Agents authenticate to Highflame while the gateway handles access to downstream models, tools, and services. Service credentials stay out of agent environments.

![](/logos/HF_Icon_Color.svg)Gateway/support-bot

0 keys held by the agent

support-bot Holds its Highflame token only

Highflame gateway Verifies the agent, then adds the credential

-   Model Model provider Provider key from the vault
-   MCP MCP server Per-user token or OAuth pass-through
-   Agent-to-agent Another agent Its own narrower token (RFC 8693)

MCP Gateway

## Secure every MCP tool call.

Connect agents to approved tools, protect downstream credentials, and enforce granular access controls.

[Explore MCP Gateway](/platform/mcp-gateway.md)

How it works

## Every action verified before execution.

Step

What happens

1 · Verify identity

Validate the agent's credential, delegated authority, and permissions.

2 · Evaluate context

Inspect the request and relevant session history for malicious instructions, suspicious behavior, and deviations from the assigned task.

3 · Enforce policy

Combine identity, permissions, and runtime detection signals to allow, redact, hold for approval, or deny the request.

4 · Record and forward

Sign the authorization decision and securely forward approved requests using the appropriate downstream credentials.

Every call through the gateway carries the agent's own identity from Highflame Identity, built on the open-source ZeroID core, so each decision knows which agent acted and for whom. [See how agents get their identity](/platform/agent-identity.md).

Connect to model providers through a unified gateway with security controls, budgets, usage visibility, and routing.

[Explore Model Gateway](/platform/model-gateway.md)

Model Gateway

## Secure and manage model access.

Agent-to-Agent Security

## Verify and control agent handoffs.

Authenticate calling agents, enforce delegation and trust boundaries, and detect malicious instructions passed between agents.

-   ### Agents call only registered agents
    
    Highflame finds agents through verified agent cards, registers them alongside your MCP servers, and refuses calls to any agent outside that registry.
    
-   ### A verified identity on every call
    
    Highflame blocks anonymous agents and requires a registered agent for sensitive operations. The gateway adds the downstream token at call time.
    
-   ### Policy enforces trust boundaries
    
    Cedar policies stop confused-deputy calls that cross trust domains, and circuit breakers halt an agent whose requests escalate turn by turn.
    
-   ### Highflame catches injection passed between agents
    
    It catches instructions smuggled from one agent to another, including through tool outputs and across many turns, before it forwards the call.
    

![](/logos/HF_Icon_Color.svg)Gateway/A2A call

A2A 1.0

**research-agent**caller **Highflame gateway**checks, then forwards **summarizer-agent**callee

-   Agent cardVerified, registered
-   Callerresearch-agent for rosa@acme.com
-   Trust domainSame tenant
-   Inter-agent injectionNone detected
-   Policya2a-identity-enforcement

Allow Forwarded with an injected token · decision signed

▸ PRODUCTION READY

< 1 ms

per policy decision, so routine actions run at full speed

150+

typed threat signals from 30+ runtime detectors

< 50 ms

added to each call through the gateway

< 3 sec

to revoke an agent and every credential it delegated, fleet-wide

New policies are tested in the Playground against a built-in attack library, then rolled out from monitor to alert to enforce, so every new rule proves itself before it enforces.

## Frequently asked questions

Something else on your mind? [Talk to our team](/contact.md).

01What is an identity-aware AI gateway?

A gateway in the path of an agent's model, MCP and agent-to-agent calls that authorizes each one on the calling agent's own verified credential, the person it acts for, and what the call is trying to do, then signs the decision. Highflame's Identity-Aware Agent Gateway works this way, built on the open-source ZeroID identity core.

02Is this the same as intent guardrails or a semantic firewall?

It includes them. Intent guardrails check whether an action fits the task, and Highflame also knows which agent is acting, whose authority it carries, and can revoke it. That's what turns a warning into a decision you can enforce.

03What happens when an action needs a person?

Highflame holds the action with a step-up challenge (RFC 9470) and runs it only if the person approves. It records both outcomes.

04What threats does it stop?

Prompt injection and jailbreaks, data and credential exfiltration through tool calls, sensitive data in prompts, and agents drifting from their task over a session.

05Can we keep the gateway we already run?

Yes. Highflame can sit behind the LLM or MCP gateway you already operate, such as LiteLLM or Portkey, and make the policy decision, or run as the gateway itself. Deploy as SaaS, in your private cloud, or on-prem.

06What happens if Highflame is unreachable?

Your agents keep running. The default is fail-open, so your agents stay online, and sensitive fleets can switch to fail-closed.

07What does it check besides identity and policy?

More than 150 typed signals from over 30 runtime detectors, including prompt injection, data leaving through a tool, and an agent drifting from its task. The signals feed the same Cedar policy that makes the decision.

The rest of the platform

## Works with the rest of Highflame

[MCP Gateway Connect agents to MCP servers without handing them the keys.](/platform/mcp-gateway.md) [Model Gateway Give teams model access and see what each agent spends.](/platform/model-gateway.md) [Endpoint Control Govern the AI agents on every laptop and cloud desktop.](/platform/endpoint-protection.md) [Agent Identity Give every agent an identity that leads back to a person.](/platform/agent-identity.md)

Deploy your way

-   **Managed SaaS**Hosted and run by Highflame
-   **Your private cloud**Deployed in your VPC
-   **On-prem**Self-hosted in your environment

SOC 2 Type II · GDPR · HIPAA

DISCOVERY · IDENTITY · CONTROL · GOVERNANCE

## See unsafe agent actions stopped before they run.

See how Highflame connects verified identity, task context, and authorization policies to protect agent workflows.

[Book a demo](/contact.md)

## Sitemap

Full site map: [/sitemap.md](https://www.highflame.com/sitemap.md). Machine index: [/sitemap-index.xml](https://www.highflame.com/sitemap-index.xml).
