Tool poisoning
Hiding malicious instructions in an MCP server or tool description so an agent executes them when it loads or calls the tool. Invisible to static config; caught by scanning tools before load and enforcing at the call.
Learn more: AI Runtime Security
Part of the Agent Control Fabric: Highflame's identity, policy, and enforcement substrate for AI agents.
Keep exploring the glossary.
Trust tier
A provenance-based level on an agent's identity (first-party/attested, verified third-party, or unverified) that gates what the agent is eligible for and tightens its policy. It is a verified input to every decision, never a bypass: each action is still authorized per request, so there is no implicit trust.
Read →ZeroID
Highflame's open-source agent identity core (Apache 2.0), built on OAuth 2.1, SPIFFE/WIMSE, and RFC 8693: the inspectable foundation beneath Highflame Identity.
Read →A2A (Agent-to-Agent)
Communication where one agent delegates work to, or calls, another agent. Each hop has to carry identity and narrow scope. Or authority leaks down the chain.
Read →Adaptive guardrails
Runtime controls that tighten themselves as new signals and attack patterns emerge, instead of relying on static rules someone has to keep updating.
Read →Agent Control Fabric
Highflame's term for the identity, policy, and enforcement substrate that governs every agent action at every boundary it crosses: one layer, not a bundle of point tools.
Read →Agent governance
Controlling what an organization's agents are allowed to do and proving what they did: discover every agent, authorize each action against policy, and produce audit evidence. Distinct from AI governance's focus on model risk.
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